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UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW
ILLEGAL JUDGMENTS AND SENTENCES IN FLORIDA
CRIMINAL GASES
The history of criminal procedure in Florida is replete with a
surprising number of improper judgments and sentences imposed
by trial courts. In most cases the error involved could have been
avoided by careful adherence to unequivocal statutory directions.
This note contains a discussion of the several causes and results of
needless illegalities in judgment and sentencing processes, with a
proposal for their elimination and the attendant improvement of the
administration of justice in the area of criminal procedure.
ILLEGAL SENTENCE

A basic consideration, almost elementary in its meaning, is that
a valid sentence must follow a valid judgment" and be based upon it.2
The price of impropriety in the content or timeliness of a sentence is
the remanding of the case for proper sentencing. 3 Although it is dear
that a sentence is void if it is not based on a valid judgment, this is
not the only reason for an erroneous sentence.
Sentence in Excess of Statutory Maximum
A trial judge commits clear error if he imposes a sentence of imprisonment for a period in excess of the statutory maximum penal
provision.4 The recent case of Collins v. State5 illustrates the timeconsuming procedural quagmire that can result from this type of
illegal sentence. The defendant pleaded guilty to a charge of operating
a gambling room and was sentenced in open court to a term of four
years in the state prison. After adjournment of court, the trial judge
discovered that he had imposed a sentence in excess of the statutory
'Ex parte Ferris, 111 Fla. 584, 149 So. 580 (1933).
2E.g., Finch v. Mayo, 137 Fla. 762, 189 So. 27 (1939); State ex rel. Spitzer v. Mayo,
129 Fla. 426, 176 So. 434 (1937); State ex rel. House v. Mayo, 122 Fla. 23, 164 So.
673 (1935); Burns v. State, 97 Fla. 231, 120 So. 860 (1929).
3E.g., Walden v. State, 83 So.2d 111 (Fla. 1955); Ex parte Wilson, 153 Fla. 459,
14 So.2d 846 (1948); Irvin v. State, 52 Fla. 51, 41 So. 785 (1906).
4E.g., Anglin v. Mayo, 88 So.2d 918 (Fla. 1956); Bascelio v. Mayo, 81 So.2d 649
(Fla. 1955).
583 So.2d 6 (Fla. 1955).
6FLA. STAT. §849.01 (1955).
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maximum of three years and directed the clerk to change the sentence
accordingly. The defendant's motion for leave to withdraw his plea
of guilty was denied, and he appealed from the final judgment and
sentence. Pending the appeal, he successfully collaterally attacked the
second sentence in a habeas corpus proceeding; the judge held the
second sentence to be void because it was not entered in the defendant's presence and ordered his return to the trial court for proper
sentencing. The defendant was brought before the trial court again
and was sentenced to a term of three years. He then attacked the
validity of the third sentence in a petition for a writ of coram nobis,
and took appeal, his second in the case, from the order denying the
writ. The two appeals were consolidated before the Supreme Court,
which affirmed the original judgment and the third sentence, since
the error was cured while the original appeal was pending. The Court
declared, however, that if the third sentence had not been imposed
during the pendency of the appeal, the case would have been reversed
because the first sentence exceeded the statutory maximum and the
second was imposed without the defendant's presence. 7
Sentence Below the Statutory Minimum
A sentence of imprisonment for a term below the statutory minimum is no less illegal than one that exceeds the statutory maximum.
In Jones v. States the defendant was convicted of larceny and sentenced to serve a prison term for a period below the statutory minimum. When this fact was pointed out to the Court during argument
on defendant's appeal on the merits, the Court remanded the case for
imposition of a proper sentence.
Sentence Names Improper Place of Imprisonment or Execution
Occasionally a trial court imposes a sentence that names a place of
imprisonment other than that provided by statute. 9 In Franklin v.
State'0 the defendant was convicted of manslaughter and sentenced
783 So.2d 6, 8 (Fla. 1955) (dictum).
864 Fla. 92, 59 So. 892 (1912).
DE.g., Brooke v. State, 99 Fla. 1275, 128 So. 814 (1930); Smith v. State, 74 Fla.
44, 76 So. 334 (1917); Hunter v. State, 64 Fla. 315, 60 So. 786 (1912) (defendant
convicted of burglary, punishable under FLA. GEN. STAT. §3281 (1906) by imprisonment in the state prison for a period not exceeding twenty years, but sentenced to
term of one year in county jail); Thompson v. State, 52 Fla. 113, 41 So. 899 (1906).
10120 Fla. 686, 163 So. 55 (1935).
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to pay a fine or, in default of payment, to serve five years at hard labor
in the state prison. This sentence was held to be erroneous because
the statute prescribed imprisonment only in the county jail in default
of payment of the fine. The converse of this situation is also true; a
sentence of imprisonment in the county jail is void when the applicable
statute directs that imprisonment be made in the state prison.11 A
death sentence is void if it is directed to be executed at an improper
place12 or by an improper method.13
Miscellaneous Incidents of Illegality
4
A sentence will be declared void if it is too vague or indefinite,'
if it directs, in the alternative, the payment of a fine and imprisonment,'5 if an indefinite term of imprisonment is imposed in default
of the payment of a fine, 16 or if no allocution precedes the imposition
17
of a death sentence.

ILLEGAL JUDGMENT

In Florida the adjudication of guilt and the imposition of sentence
are separate parts of the same process.' 8 The causes of illegality in
judgment are nearly as numerous as the varied causes of illegality in
the sentence proper. Because a valid sentence can never rest on an
unlawful judgment, it is desirable to examine the form of unlawful
judgments.
A conviction is invalid and the case is subject to a remand for
proper adjudication if the record does not expressly contain the entry
of judgment, for its existence can not be implied.,9 The judgment is
invalid if the judge neglects to adjudge the defendant guilty in open
2
court2 0o or fails to state the offense for which he was convicted. '
"1Op. Att'y Gen. Fla. 056-18 (Jan. 19, 1956).
"-Webster v. State, 47 Fla. 108, 36 So. 584 (1904).
13Ex parte Browne, 93 Fla. 332, 111 So. 518 (1927).
14Wallace v. State, 41 Fla. 547, 26 So. 713 (1899).
'5Ex parte Martini, 23 Fla. 343, 2 So. 689 (1887).
16Roberts v. State, 30 Fla. 82, 11 So. 536 (1892).
17Keech v. State, 15 Fla. 591 (1876). But cf. Blount v. State, 30 Fla. 287, 11
So. 547 (1892); Hodge v. State, 29 Fla. 500, 10 So. 556 (1892) (no allocution necessary if conviction not of capital crime).
'sSee FLA. STAT. §§921.01,.02,.05 (1955).
'GEllis v. State, 100 Fla. 27, 129 So. 106 (1930).
'2OSee FLA. STAT. §921.02 (1955).
21House v. State, 127 Fla. 145, 172 So. 734 (1937); Anderson v. Chapman, 109
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The judgment is unlawful when the defendant is adjudged guilty
of a crime greater2 2 than or entirely different23 from the statutory
offense of which he was convicted. The former type of illegal judgment is demonstrated in Lewis v. State,21 in which the Court held the
judgment erroneous when the defendant was adjudged guilty of
burglary upon a verdict of guilt of breaking and entering with intent
to commit a misdemeanor. In the recent case of Walden v. State25 the
Court reversed a similar judgment. The jury found Walden guilty
of breaking and entering with intent to commit a misdemeanor, but
he was sentenced to ten years in prison after being adjudged guilty of
burglary. The offense of which the defendant was found guilty by the
jury carries a maximum imprisonment of five years. 26 The Florida
Court emphasized that the evil in allowing this type of erroneous
judgment to stand is too plain to require further comment. 27
METHODS AND EFFECTS OF ArrACK ON ILLEGALITY

Appeal
A person convicted of a crime in Florida enjoys a statutory right
to appeal from a final judgment of conviction.2 The state29 as well
as the defendant 0 may appeal from a sentence on the ground that it
is illegal.
At common law the result of an illegal sentence was the reversal
of the conviction and the discharge of the prisoner; 31 today the usual
consequence is the remanding of the case for proper sentencing3 2 unless
the error complained of by the defendant was favorable to him and the
state has not appealed.3 3 The error may be cured by the trial judge if he
Fla. 54, 146 So. 675 (1933).
2-Shuler v. State, 57 So.2d 336 (Fla. 1952); Holloman v. State, 140 Fla. 59, 191

So. 36 (1939).
23Ex parte Wilson, 153 Fla. 459, 14 So.2d 846 (1943).
24154 Fla. 825, 19 So.2d 199 (1944).
2 83 So.2d 111 (Fla. 1955).
26FLA. STAT. §810.05 (1955).
2783 So.2d 111, 112 (Fla. 1955) (dictum).
28FLA. STAT. §§924.05,.09 (1955), Wells v. State, 38 So.2d 464 (Fla. 1949), State
ex rel. Cheney v. Rowe, 152 Fla. 316, 11 So.2d 585 (1943).
29FLA. STAT. §924.07 (5) (1955).
30FLA. STAT. §924.06 (5) (1955).
319 HARv. L. Rav. 220 (1895).
32See note 3 supra.
33See Tilghman v. State, 64 So.2d 555 (Fla. 1953).
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modifies the sentence during the term in which it was imposed and
before the defendant begins to satisfy it.34 After the expiration of the
term, the court has no further power to do so. 35
Habeas Corpus
The habeas corpus proceeding has been used to attack a sentence
directing imprisonment for a period in excess of the lawful maximum
period 36 and when the sentence was of a different character from that
allowed by law. 37 Similarly, habeas corpus has been used to collaterally
attack a judgment rendered by a court that exceeded its power or
otherwise had no jurisdiction. 38 The Florida Court ordered a defendant discharged from custody when he was sentenced to an excessive
term and had served it for a period nearly equal to the maximum
period provided by the statute under which he should have been
sentenced. 39 Although discharge is the common result of the entry of
judgments by courts that have no power to do so, 40 a successful habeas
the remanding of the
corpus attack on formal irregularities results in
41
prisoner for proper adjudication or sentence.
CONCLUSION

In light of the recurring violations of the numerous statutory penal
provisions of the criminal law, there is need for reappraisal of the effectiveness of present sentencing procedures. Not every convicted
person enjoys the benefit of counsel; it is reasonable to assume that
many violations remain undiscovered. The extent to which violations
34Collins v. State, 83 So.2d 6 (Fla. 1955); Scroggins v. State, 125 Fla. 49, 169 So.
547 (1936); Tillman v. State, 58 Fla. 113, 50 So. 675 (1909).
35Tucker v. State, 100 Fla. 1440, 1444, 131 So. 327, 328 (1930) (dictum); Tanner
v. Wiggins, 54 Fla. 203, 212, 45 So. 459. 462 (1907) (dictum).
36E.g., Bascelio v. Mayo, 81 So.2d 649 (Fla. 1955); Collingsworth v. Mayo, 77

So.2d 843 (Fla. 1955); In re Camp, 92 Fla. 185, 109 So. 445 (1926).
37E.g., State ex rel. Grebstein v. Lehman, 100 Fla. 481, 129 So. 818 (1930); Ex
parte Browne, 93 Fla. 332, 111 So. 518 (1927).
38E.g., Ex parte Livingston, 116 Fla. 640, 156 So. 612 (1934); Ex parte Davidson,
76 Fla. 272, 79 So. 727 (1918).
39Hepburn v. Chapman, 109 Fla. 133, 149 So. 196 (1933); see also Devoe v.
Tucker, 113 Fla. 805, 152 So. 624 (1934).
4oSee Skipper v. Schumacher, 124 Fla. 384, 169 So. 58 (1936); Anderson v. Chapman, 109 Fla. 54, 58, 146 So. 675, 677 (1933) (dictum).
41Cases cited note 39 supra.
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do occur can be determined only by examination of the judgments
and sentences imposed upon convicted persons in each of the judicial
circuits. The Florida Bar is the only logical agency to sponsor such
a survey.
The most expedient elimination of these violations can be effected
by remedial legislation requiring a written verification by the prosecuting attorney of every judgment and sentence. The Florida Bar's
Committee on Criminal Law and Procedure recently made a less
stringent recommendation in the form of a "request" to prosecutors
to become better acquainted with the penal provisions of the criminal
statutes. 42 Whether such a request will effect the desired check of
each judgment and sentence is questionable.
The additional responsibility of requiring verification is not inconsistent with the prosecutor's established high obligation to assure
the defendant a fair tria 43 and to deal with him in a manner that will
"bless rather than damn him." 44 If the legislature reposes in the office
of the prosecutor the responsibility of verifying the legality of each
judgment and sentence, the administration of justice will be improved
procedurally and, more important, a long step will have been taken
toward elimination of the bitter injustice inherent in the satisfaction
of an illegal sentence that occurs not because of mistaken judgment
but because of carelessness.
PAUL W. DANAHY, JR.

42Annual Committee Reports of The FloridaBar, 30 FLA. B.J. 259, 271 (1956).
3
4 See Oglesby v. State, 156 Fla. 481, 23 So.2d 558 (1945).
44Daugherty v. State, 154 Fla. 308, 310, 17 So.2d 290, 291 (1944) (per Terrell, J.).
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